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THE CURT FLOOD ACT OF 1998:
A HOLLOW GESTURE AFTER
ALL THESE YEARS?
EDMUND P. EDMONDS*
In 1998, Congress passed legislation' ostensibly designed to provide
major league baseball players with narrowly fashioned relief from three
United States Supreme Court decisions2 that gave Major League Base-
ball an exemption from antitrust laws. The act was named in honor of
Curtis Charles Flood,3 a courageous4 baseball player who filed suit in
1969 against Major League Baseball's reserve clause after being traded
from the St. Louis Cardinals to the Philadelphia Phillies. Flood was so
incensed at the treatment accorded to him by his employers that he
wrote to Commissioner Bowie Kuhn demanding:
* Director of the Law Library and Professor of Law, Loyola University New Orleans
School of Law, B.A., 1973, University of Notre Dame, M.L.S., 1974, University of Maryland,
J.D., 1978, University of Toledo. The author wishes to express his appreciation to Nancy L.
Strohmeyer, Associate Law Librarian for Public Services, Loyola University New Orleans
School of Law, for her expert editorial assistance.
1. Curt Flood Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-297, 112 Stat. 2824. The passage of the Curt
Flood Act of 1998 came after nearly fifty years of Congressional consideration of baseball's
antitrust exemption. For more details, see, e.g., Edmund P. Edmonds, Over Forty Years in the
On-Deck Circle: Congress and the Baseball Antitrust Exemption, 1994 T. MARSHALL L. Rnv.
627; STEPHEN R. LowE, THE Km ON THE SANDLOT: CONGRESS AND PROFESSIONAL SPORTS,
1910-1992, 15-60 (1995).
2. See Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Base-
ball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922); Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953); Flood v.
Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
3. Curt Flood died on January 20, 1997, at the UCLA Medical Center after a prolonged
fight against throat cancer. See, e.g., Murray Chass, On Baseball: Flood Was a Man for Every
Season, N.Y. Tnuds, Jan. 21, 1997; Baseball Pioneer Dies at 59: Flood Led Fight for Player
Free Agency, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 21, 1997, at Dl; Baseball: Outfielder's Un-
successful Challenge of Reserve System in 1970s Led to Free Agency, L.A. Tzms, Jan. 21, 1997,
at Cl; I. J. Rosenberg, Baseball Notebook. Players Owe a Tip of the Cap, and Much More, to
Flood, ATLANTA JOuRNAL-CONsTrruTON, Jan. 26, 1997, at F02; Ross Newhan, Player Cham-
pion Flood Dead at 59; Basebalk Outfielder's Unsuccessful Challenge of Reserve System in
1970s Led to Free Agency, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1997, at Cl; Bob Broeg, Flood Fell a Few
Singles Short of Fame and Riches, ST. Louis POsT-DIsPATCH, Jan. 27, 1997, at Cl; Richard
Reeves, Editorial, The Inglorious Undoing of a Proud, Angry Man, SEATrTLE TiMES, Jan. 29,
1997, at B4. For an interesting website highlighting Flood's life and legal legacy see http://
xroads.virginia.edul-CLASS/am483-97/projectsbrady/flood.html.
4. Rep. John Conyers, Jr. (D-Mich.) identified Flood as a courageous and beautiful ath-
lete during the Congressional discussion of the Curt Flood Act of 1998. 144 Cong. Rec.
H9942-03, H9944 (Oct. 7, 1998).
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After twelve years in the major leagues, I do not feel that I am a
piece of property to be bought and sold irrespective of my wishes.
I believe that any system which produces that result violates my
basic rights as a citizen and is inconsistent with the laws of the
United States and of the several States.
It is my desire to play baseball in 1970, and I am capable of play-
ing. I have received a contract offer from the Philadelphia club,
but I believe I have the right to consider offers from others clubs
before making any decisions. I, therefore, request that you make
known to all Major League clubs my feelings in this matter, and
advise them of my availability for the 1970 season. 5
Flood would ultimately lose his case before the Supreme Court. How-
ever, less than five years later arbitrator Peter Seitz would award free
agency status to pitchers Andy Messersmith and Dave McNally. The
availability of free agency in professional baseball has resulted in over
two decades of phenomenal salary growth.7 In addition to the escalation
of salaries, the Major League Baseball Players Association has become a
formidable force in negotiating collective bargaining agreements with
the owners.
The passage of the Curt Flood Act of 1998 by the 105th Congress
came over seventy-five years after the Supreme Court ruled in Federal
Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Base-
ball Clubs8 that baseball was not involved in interstate commerce or
trade as customarily defined within the context of sections one and two
of the Sherman Antitrust Act.9 In taking this action, Congress finally
responded to the Supreme Court's plea in Toolson v. New York
Yankees10 and Flood v. Kuhn" to seek a legislative solution to the ex-
emption created in Federal Baseball. The legislation further reacted to a
5. Curt Flood, Txi WAY IT IS 194-195 (1971). See also BowiE KuN, HARDBALL: Th-
EDUCATION OF A BASEBALL COMMISSIONER 83 (1987); MARVIN MILLER, A WHOLE DIFFER-
ENT BALL GAME: THE SPORT AND BUSINESS OF BASEBALL 190-191 (1991); LEE LoWENFISH,
THE IMPERFECT DIAMOND: A HISTORY OF BASEBALL'S LABOR WARS 207 (Revised Edition
1991).
6. National and American League Professional Baseball Clubs v. Major League Baseball
Players Ass'n, 66 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 101 (1976). See also Kansas City Royals Baseball
Corp. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976).
7. See, e.g., MARTIN J. GREENBERG & JAMES T. GRAY, SPORTS LAW PRAcIcE 437-442
(2nd Ed. 1998); ANDREW ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS: A PROBING LOOK INSIDE
THE BIG BUSINESS OF OUR NATIONAL PASTIME 112-113 (1992).
8. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1994).
10. 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
11. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
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joint agreement between Major League Baseball and the Major League
Baseball Players Association embodied in their most recent collective
bargaining agreement to appeal to Congress for a legislative change to
the "anomaly" and "aberration" recognized and reaffirmed by the
Supreme Court in Flood.2 Although the legislation was hailed as signif-
icant by numerous Congressmen,'13 one must ask whether this act is any-
thing more than a hollow gesture to the memory of Curt Flood.
Although baseball players now join basketball and football players in
their ability potentially to wage antitrust war against management, a se-
ries of cases' 4 culminating in the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v.
Pro Football, Inc." insures that the nonstatutory labor law exemption
will nearly always trump a complaint predicated upon antitrust grounds.
This article will first outline the provisions of the Curt Flood Act of
1998 and recent decisions limiting the reach of baseball's antitrust ex-
emption. Second, Congressional commentary will be discussed. Third,
the development of the nonstatutory labor exemption by the Supreme
12. See id. at 282. Rep. Henry Hyde (R-Ill.) noted in his Congressional testimony that
"(g)iven the agreement of the parties, Congress has now decided to legislate in this area, but
we do so only in an extremely narrow manner." 144 Cong. Rec. H9942-03 (1998 WL 694709
(Cong. Rec.)). Article XXVIII of the Basic Agreement Between the American League of
Professional Baseball Clubs and the National League of Professional Baseball Clubs and Ma-
jor League Baseball Players Association (effective Jan. 1, 1997), reprinted in Gary A. Uber-
stine, editor, LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS 5-149 (1988), provided that
Major League Baseball and the Major League Baseball Players Association would both lobby
Congress for legislation to "clarify that Major League Baseball Players are covered under the
antitrust laws" with the same rights as football and basketball players. Article XXVIII also
stressed that the act should not change antitrust laws in any other ways concerning the parties
to the collective bargaining agreement. Id Furthermore, if legislation was not passed by De-
cember 31, 1998, the collective bargaining agreement would be terminated on December 31,
2000, rather than on October 31, 2000, or one day after the last game of the World Series in
2000, as provided in Article XXVII of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 5-148. The
Major League Baseball Players Association was granted the right to exercise an extension
option under Articles XXVII and XXVIII to push the agreement through the 2001 season. Id.
at 5-148-5-149.
13. Rep. Mike Bilirakis (R-Fla.), Rep. Jim Bunning (R-Ky), Rep. John Conyers, Jr. (D-
Mich.), Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), Rep. Henry Hyde (R-Ill.), Sen. Pat Leahy (D-Vt.).
14. See Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976); McCourt v.
California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp.
738 (D.D.C. 1976), afid in part, rev'd in part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Wood v. National
Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987); Bridgeman v. National Basketball Ass'n, 675 F.
Supp. 960 (D.N.J. 1987); Powell v. National Football League, 678 F. Supp. 777 (D. Minn.
1988); Powell v. National Football League, 690 F. Supp. 812 (D. Minn. 1988); Powell v. Na-
tional Football League, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989);, Powell v. National Football League, 764
F. Supp. 1351 (D. Minn. 1991); McNeil v. National Football League, 790 F. Supp. 871 (D.
Minn. 1982); Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2116 (1996).
15. 116 S. Ct. 2116 (1996).
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Court will be outlined followed by a discussion of its application to
sports. The article will conclude with an expression of the likely impact
of the act on the rights of players or management to use antitrust laws
effectively against the other party.
THE CURT FLOOD Acr oF 1998
The purpose of the act as outlined in section two is "to state that
major league baseball players are covered under the antitrust laws.' 16
Section two further notes that major league baseball players are granted
the same antitrust rights as basketball and football players.'" The United
States Supreme Court held in Radovich v. National Football League'8
that the National Football League did not enjoy the same antitrust ex-
emption that the Court had granted to baseball in Federal Baseball and
Toolson.19 Fourteen years later, the Court held that professional basket-
ball was similarly not exempt from antitrust assault in Haywood v. Na-
tional Basketball Association.20 The final clause of section two declares
that the act "[d]oes not change the application of the antitrust laws in
any other context or with respect to any other person or entity."'" The
clause appears to assure the owners and commissioner of Major League
Baseball that all other aspects of the business of baseball will remain free
from antitrust challenge.
Section three declares that the legislation involves "the business of
organized professional major league baseball directly relating to or affect-
ing employment of major league baseball players."'2 Furthermore, sub-
section (b) reiterates that the act only relates to employment of
players.23 The drafters of the act have taken great pains to reinforce in
numerous ways the extremely narrow grant accorded in section two.
Subsection (b) then lists six instances in which the act does not
change the existing jurisprudence concerning baseball's antitrust exemp-
tion.24 First, the act does not grant any rights to minor league players,
including "any reserve clause as applied to minor league players."' 5
16. Curt Flood Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-297, § 2, 112 Stat. 2824.
17. See id.
18. 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
19. Id. at 447-448.
20. 401 U.S. 1204, 1205 (1971). See also, Flood, 407 U.S. at 280; Denver Rockets v. All-
Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
21. Pub. L. No. 105-297, § 2.
22. Id. at § 3(a)(emphasis added).
23. See id. at § 3(b).
24. See id.
25. Id. at § 3(b)(1).
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Fearful that minor league players might employ the act to rid themselves
of the burden of the minor league reserve system, minor league baseball
owners petitioned their Congressmen to refrain from changing the deli-
cate balance that exists between major league and minor league base-
ball. Minor league baseball has seen a significant resurgence in the past
twenty-five years in fan interest resulting in an increased financial value
for franchise owners and a greater rationale for cities to try to attract
and keep minor league teams.26 Many cities with minor league teams
have responded by investing millions of dollars in new state-of-the-art
facilities. A change in the employment conditions of minor league play-
ers would jeopardize these expenditures. The second enumerated item
under subsection (b) underscores the act's grant of antitrust rights only
to major league players by disallowing any claim based upon the Profes-
sional Baseball Agreement between Major League Baseball and the Na-
tional Association of Professional Baseball Leagues, the governing body
of minor league baseball.27
FRANCHisE RELOCATION
The third feature of baseball specifically identified by the act as con-
tinuing to enjoy protection from any antitrust action concerns "franchise
expansion, location or relocation, franchise ownership issues," and "the
relationship between the Office of the Commissioner and franchise own-
ers. '' 2 Furthermore, the marketing or sales of baseball or the licensing
of intellectual property rights cannot be challenged.29 The Commis-
sioner and the owners in baseball have not been subjected to antitrust
liability regarding franchise relocation as the National Football League
was in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football
League.0 In fact, in Wisconsin v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc.,31 the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court upheld the viability of the baseball exemption re-
specting franchise relocation of the Braves from Milwaukee to Atlanta.
The decision was rendered in a suit claiming a violation of state antitrust
26. See, e.g., ZmALsT, supra note 7, at 112-113; NEiL J. SULLivAN, THm MINORS: THE
STRUGGLES AND THE TRIuMPH OF BASEBALL'S POOR RELATION FROM 1876 TO THE PRESENT
256-273 (1990).
27. Pub. L. No. 105-297, § 3(b)(2).
28. Id- at § 3(b)(3).
29. See id.
30. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984) (antitrust liability issue) & 791 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1986)
(damages issue).
31. 144 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 1966).
1!999]
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law. Because the structure of league was at issue, the court ruled against
the state. However, the court stated
(w)e venture to guess that this exemption does not cover every
type of business activity to which a baseball club or league might
be a party and does not protect clubs or leagues from application
of the federal acts to activities which are not incidental to the
maintenance of the league structure ...32
Furthermore, the drafters of the legislation appear to establish that the
decisions in Piazza v. Major League Baseball,3 Butterworth v. National
League,3aand Minnesota Twins Partnership v. State by Humphrey35
should not be relied upon.
In Piazza, the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
considered claims by Vincent M. Piazza, Vincent N. Tirendi and PT
Baseball, Inc. that Major League Baseball had interfered illegally in
their efforts to purchase the San Francisco Giants and relocate the team
to Tampa Bay, Florida. 6 Plaintiffs asserted numerous claims under the
United States Constitution, federal antitrust laws, and certain state
laws.37 Judge John Padova's thorough and analytical decision discussed
the standard of review, 8 federal Constitutional claims,3 9 a civil rights
claim,40 the relevant market for antitrust analysis,41 and standing42
before turning to a consideration of baseball's antitrust exemption claim.
Judge Padova noted that each of the three cases involved the reserve
clause.43 Major League Baseball argued that the exemption extended to
the "business of baseball" generally, while the plaintiffs asserted that the
exemption was limited to the reserve clause.' Judge Padova asserted
that "the Court in Flood v. Kuhn stripped from Federal Baseball and
Toolson any precedential value that those cases may have had beyond
the particular facts there involved, i.e., the reserve clause. ' 45 Judge Pa-
dova concluded that the exemption was properly limited to the reserve
32. Id. at 15.
33. 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
34. 644 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1994).
35. 1998-1 Trade Cases (CCH) 72,136.
36. Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 421.
37. See idL
38. See id. at 424-425.
39. See id. at 425-426.
40. See id. at 426-429.
41. See Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 429-431.
42. See id. at 431-433.
43. See id. at 435.
44. See id.
45. Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 436.
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system, a non-issue in the case, and "reject[ed] Baseball's argument that
it is exempt from antitrust liability in this case."46 In finding a narrow
application for baseball's exemption, Judge Padova distinguished
Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn,47 a case involving the power of the
Commissioner to disapprove the sale for three baseball players from the
Oakland As to other teams.48 Judge Padova cited the finding of the
court in Henderson Broadcasting Corp. v. Houston Sports Association4 9
which stated that the exemption did not cover the broadcasting of
games.
Butterworth5" involved the same factual context as Piazza. Florida
Attorney General Robert Butterworth issued antitrust civil investigative
demands against the National League and its president, Bill White, in-
volving the Giants-Tampa Bay situtation.51 The Circuit Court of Flor-
ida's Ninth Judicial Circuit issued an order quashing the Attorney
General's investigation and civil investigative demands and determined
that the antitrust exemption applied. 2 The Florida Fifth District Court
of Appeal affirmed the decision,53 and certified a question to the Florida
Supreme Court requesting its determination as to the applicability of
baseball's exemption to the sale and relocation of franchises under fed-
eral and state antitrust laws. The court ruled against Major League
Baseball citing favorably the decision in Piazza because of its thorough
analysis of the issues and the case law.54 Like Piazza, the Butterworth
Court refused to extend the antitrust exemption beyond the reserve
clause.55
In Humphrey5 6 a Minnesota district court considered the request by
the state's attorney general to investigate baseball through discovery to
determine if the business and trade laws of the state had been violated.
The attorney general's concern was whether or not Major League Base-
ball owners had conspired to secure federal funding to construct a new
stadium in Minneapolis/St. Paul to prevent the relocation of the Twins
46. Id. at 438.
47. 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978).
48. 831 F. Supp. at 436-437.
49. 541 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
50. 644 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1994).
51. See id. at 1022.
52. See id
53. 622 So. 2d. 177 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
54. 644 So. 2d at 1025.
55. See idt
56. 1998-1 Trade Cases (CCH) 72,136 at 81,885.
1999]
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franchise to North Carolina.57 The court felt that it was essential to de-
termine the application of baseball's antitrust exemption prior to finding
whether to allow the use of Civil Investigatory Demands (CIDs). The
court began with a discussion of the Supreme Court's decisions in Fed-
eral Baseball, Toolson, and Flood." Agreeing with the Butterworth deci-
sion, the court noted the thoroughness and detail of Judge Padoza's
analysis59 and concluded "that the ruling in Flood confines the antitrust
exemption to the narrow area of the reserve clause."60 The court next
turned to the issue of whether the Commerce Clause 6' prevented the
action that the attorney general wished to take.62 In finding that the
issues raised were serious and might violate state or federal antitrust
laws, the court cited Morsani v. Major League Baseball63and Postema v.
National League of Professional Baseball Clubs64 in "holding that state
antitrust laws are neither pre-empted nor precluded by any federal con-
siderations. ' 65 The Minnesota Supreme Court heard oral arguments on
the appeal of this case on February 3, 1999.66
The Humphrey case might offer the first judicial test regarding the
impact of subsection 3(b) of the Curt Flood Act of 1998. The language
of the subsection states that the "section does not create ... a cause of
action by which to challenge under the antitrust laws... any conduct...
including but not limited to.- (3) the business of organized professional
baseball relating to or affecting franchise expansion, location or reloca-
tion, franchise ownership issue."'67 However, the introductory language
of the subsection states that "[n]o court shall rely on the enactment of
this section as a basis for changing the application of the antitrust laws to
any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements other than those set forth in
subsection (a)." '68
57. See Robert Whereatt, High Court Hears Argument on State's Baseball Inquiry, MiN-
NEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL STAR-TRm., Feb. 4, 1999, at B3.
58. See Humphrey at 81,886-81,888.
59. Id. at 81,888.
60. Id. at 81,889.
61. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
62. See Humphrey at 81,889.
63. 663 So. 2d 653, 657 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
64. 799 F. Supp. 1475 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), rev'd in part on other grounds, 998 F.2d 60 (2d Cir.
1993).
65. Humphrey at 81,890.
66. See, e.g., Whereatt, supra note 57; Professor Stephen Ross authored an amicus brief
for the attorney general, see, e.g., La Velle E. Neal, III, Tewksbury Isn't Done Teaching, MIN-
NEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL STAR-Tim., Sept. 2, 1998, at C6.
67. Pub. L. No. 105-297, § 3(b).
68. Id. (emphasis added).
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Although a recent decision of the Eastern District of Louisiana 9 re-
fused to follow the line of authority established in Piazza, Butterworth,
Humphrey, Morsani, and Postema, the question arises as to whether or
not these courts are correct in deciding that the exemption has been re-
stricted to the reserve clause. If the exemption does enjoy that judicial
determination, then holding that the exemption applies to franchise relo-
cation is a change in the application of the laws. Although Congress
seemed to foreclose reliance on these decisions, the nature of the lan-
guage provides a slight crack in the otherwise air-tight nature of the leg-
islation for an imaginative judge like John Padova to argue that the
language of the statute most conform with the reality that the exemption
has already been reduced to covering only the reserve clause. Major
League Baseball and its supporters will certainly argue that such a read-
ing goes against the meaning and intent of the legislators passing this
statute. Furthermore, such a reading would defeat the meaning of all of
the language in section three of the act. However, the language allows
for an argument over the meaning of these cases -within the context of
the act.
The fourth listed aspect of the business of baseball maintaining pro-
tection under subsection 3(b)70 is the right to pool the league's transfer
of broadcast rights in "sponsored telecasts" under the Sports Broadcast-
ing Act of 1961.7 1 The great disparity between the broadcast rights of
teams in large markets versus small markets is probably the greatest
challenge to the financial viability of Major League Baseball. Further-
more, this problem threatens to undermine the collective bargaining re-
lationship when one team, such as the Los Angeles Dodgers, can pay
one player, Kevin Brown, more than the total salaries of the entire roster
of the Montreal Expos. 72
The fifth item listed under subsection (b) is the relationship between
organized professional baseball and umpires or other employees of or-
69. See New Orleans Pelicans Baseball, Inc. v. National Ass'n of Professional Baseball
Leagues, Inc., 1994 WL 631144 (E.D. La. 1994). See, e.g., Portland Baseball Club, Inc. v.
Kuhn, 368 F. Supp. 1004, affd per curiam, 491 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir. 1974); Professional Schools
& Clubs, Inc. v. Kuhn, 693 F.2d 1085 (11th Cir. 1982); Triple-A Baseball Club Ass'n v. North-
eastern Baseball, Inc. 832 F.2d 214 (1st Cir. 1987).
70. Pub. L. No. 105-297, § 3 (b)(4).
71. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1295 (1994).
72. See Barre Campbell, Beattie Cool Under Fire, Expos GM Says Team's Future Hinges
on Ownership, Stadium, OTtAWA SuN, Feb. 12, 1999, at 83; Joe Giuliotti, Baseball Notes; Let's
Bring On Big Hurt-Frankly, Sox Need Thomas, BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 24, 1999, at B24;
Howard Beck, Will Fans Return? NBA Takes Steps to Woo Spectators, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Jan.
8, 1999, at SI.
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ganized professional baseball. The most likely reason for this statutory
language involves litigation between umpires and Major League
Baseball.
In Salerno v. American League of Professional Baseball Clubs,73 the
plaintiffs, umpires fired by the president of the American League, filed
an antitrust claim against the league. The umpires claimed that they
were not discharged for incompetence as claimed by the American
League, but, rather, because of their attempts to organize the umpires
for collective bargaining with the league.74 The case was decided two
years prior to Flood. Judge Friendly of the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals declined to rule for the umpires feeling that serious doubt existed
as to whether or not a claim for breach of contract or tort would provide
a basis for an antitrust claim even if the exemption did not exempt Major
League Baseball. Judge Friendly deferred to the Supreme Court's rul-
ings in Federal Baseball and Toolson while offering his view about the
vitality of the exemption.75
Seven years ago, the National League defended an employment dis-
crimination and a common law restraint of trade case in Postema v. Na-
tional League of Professional Baseball Clubs.76 Pam Postema, the first
female to umpire above the Class A level,77 argued that her termination
by Triple-A Baseball on November 6, 1989, was the result of gender-
based discrimination.78 In refusing to dismiss the common law restraint
of trade claim, the court noted that "the exemption does not provide
baseball with blanket immunity for anti-competitive behavior in every
73. 429 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1970).
74. See id. at 1004.
75. In one of the more eloquent statements regarding baseball's exemption prior to
Flood, Judge Friendly asserted:
[We continue to believe that the Supreme Court should retain the exclusive privilege
of overruling its own decisions, save perhaps when opinions already delivered have
created a near certainty that only the occasion is needed for pronouncement of the
doom. While we should not fall out of our chairs with surprise at the news that Federal
Baseball and Toolson had been overruled, we are not at all certain the Court is ready to
give them a happy despatch (sic).
Id. at 1005.
76. 799 F. Supp. 1475 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), rev'd in part on other grounds, 998 F.2d 60 (2d Cir.
1993).
77. 799 F. Supp. at 1478.
78. For a discussion of Postema's career as a minor league umpire, see PAm POSTEMA &
GENE WOJCrnCHOWSKI, You'vE GOT To HAVE B*LLS TO MAKE IT iN Tis LEAGUE: My
LwE As AN UMPIRE (1992). For an analysis of Postema's lawsuit, see, e.g., Sharlene A. Mc-
Evoy, The Umpire Strikes Out: Postema v. National League: Major League Gender Discrimi-
nation, 11 U. MIAMI ENr. & SPORTS L. REv. 1 (1993).
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context in which it operates. ' '79 In another blow to Major League Base-
ball's desire to extend its exemption to the entire business of baseball,
the court concluded
that Defendants have not shown any reason why the baseball ex-
emption should apply to baseball's employment relations with its
umpires. Unlike the league structure or the reserve system, base-
ball's relations with non-players are not a unique characteristic or
need of the game. Anti-competitive conduct toward umpires is
not an essential part of baseball and in no way enhances its vital-
ity or viability.80
Certainly, the drafters of the legislation are insisting that, notwith-
standing the language of Postema, the relationship between Major
League Baseball and its umpires should not be subjected to antitrust lia-
bility after the passage of act. Major League Baseball's contentious rela-
tionship with the Major League Baseball Players Association has also at
times been the hallmark of its relationship with the union representing
umpires and its executive director, Richie Phillips."'
The final listing under subsection (b) is an additional statement to
ensure that courts will not use the act to change preexisting antitrust
laws beyond the scope of the employment relationship of major league
baseball players. The act specifically excludes "any conduct, acts, prac-
tices, or agreements of persons not in the business of organized profes-
sional major league baseball"8" from coverage under the statute.
Subsection (c) provides that only "a major league baseball player has
standing to sue."83 Four definitions are provided for what constitutes a
"major league baseball player" for the purposes of this subsection.,4
The first definition is any "party to a major league player's contract" or
one who "is playing baseball at the major league level."8 5 The second
listed definition is one "who was a party to a major league player's con-
tract or playing baseball at the major league level at the time of the in-
79. 799 F. Supp. at 1489.
80. Id.
81. See Sean McAdam, The Day is Coming When Umps Won't Be Above the Law: After
Years of Increasing Power and Decreasing Performance By Umpires, Baseball Officials are
Tackling the Problem, PROVmENCE SuNDAY JoutRm'AL, Oct. 18, 1998, at D1; Ross Newhan,
Budding Leader Bud Selig, Who Used to Say He Didn't Want to be Commissioner, is Expected
to be Near-Unanimous Choice Today Because He's a Known Quantity, L.A. TiMEs, July 9,
1998, at C1.
82. Pub. L. No. 105-297, § 3(b)(6).
83. Id. at § 3(c). This section created some concern for the Department of Justice because
it deprives them of standing.
84. Id. at § 3(c)(1)-3(c)(4).
85. Id. at § 3(c)(1).
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jury that is the subject of the complaint." 6 The third definition allows a
claim for a former major league player or a former party to a major
league contract who alleges an antitrust violation for one "injured in his
efforts to secure a subsequent major league player's contract."87 There
is a provision within the subsection, however, asserting that no claim can
relate to employment "at the minor league level, including any organ-
ized professional baseball amateur or first-year player draft, or any re-
serve clause as applied to minor league players.""8 The final definition
provides relief for:
a person who was a party to a major league player's contract or
who was playing baseball at the major league level at the conclu-
sion of the last full championship season immediately preceding
the expiration of the last collective bargaining agreement between
persons in the business of organized professional major league
baseball and the exclusive collective bargaining representative of
major league baseball players.8 9
Three particular provisions under subsection (d) bear mentioning.
The first is contained within subsection (d)(2) reiterating that only em-
ployment issues within Major League Baseball are subject to subsection
(a).90 This provision presumably limits the impact of decisions like Pi-
azza, Butterworth, or Humphrey that tried to alter the long-standing po-
sition that the exemption applied to all aspects of the business of
baseball.
The second important provision within subsection (d), (d)(4),
presents perhaps the most significant limitation on the reach of the new
act: "Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the application
to organized professional baseball of the nonstatutory labor exemption
from the antitrust laws." 91 This subsection, the focus of the majority of
the rest of this article, effectively precludes the use of the antitrust lever-
age provided by the act within the context of a labor relationship.
Finally, subsection (d)(5) states that "(t)he scope of the conduct, acts,
practices, or agreements covered by subsection (b) shall not be strictly or
narrowly construed."'  This pro-management component of the act was
written so that major league ownership could assert to a court any addi-
86. Id. at § 3(c)(2).
87. Pub. L. No. 105-297, § 3(c)(3).
88. Id
89. Id.
90. See iU at § (d)(2).
91. Id. at § (d)(4).
92. Pub. L. No. 105-297, § (d)(5).
[Vol. 9:315
A HOLLOW GESTURE
tional set of factors necessary to insure the strict construction of subsec-
tion (a) limiting the antitrust implications of the act solely to
employment issues. This subsection seems to assure by redundancy the
unequivocal desire of the drafters not to allow a court any opening to
assert that antitrust law can be used in a non-labor area.
CONGRESSIONAL COMMENTARY
In the discussion on the floor of Congress, Representative Henry
Hyde (R-Ill.) urged passage of the bill noting: "(a)fter years of disagree-
ment, the baseball players, the baseball owners, and the minor leagues
have reached an historic agreement on the application of the antitrust
laws to labor relations in baseball."'93 After listing the trilogy of
Supreme Court cases establishing baseball's exemption, Representative
Hyde stated "(g)iven the agreement of the parties, Congress has now
decided to legislate in this area, but we do so only in an extremely nar-
row manner."94 After discussing the collective bargaining agreement
clause requiring Major League Baseball and the Major League Baseball
Players Association to petition Congress for legislative action, Represen-
tative Hyde stressed the importance of the nonstatutory labor
exemption:
I want to note that nothing in this bill will affect in any way the
protections afforded to the major league clubs by the nonstatu-
tory labor exemption .... (B)oth the players and the owners were
willing to support the repeal of the specific and narrow portion of
the baseball exemption covering labor relations between major
league players and major league clubs. The bill was carefully
drafted, however, to leave the remainder of the exemption
intact.95
Representative Hyde next turned his attention to issues raised by mi-
nor league owners by asserting that the act would not provide any relief
to one trying to attack any aspect of minor league employment. 96
Before turning over the discussion to Representative John Conyers, Jr.
(D-Mich.), Representative Hyde supported the narrow construction of
the legislation by noting that "[tjhis bill does not affect the application of
the antitrust laws to anyone outside the business of baseball." 97
93. 144 Cong. Rec. H9942-03, H9943 (Oct. 7, 1998).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See id.
97. I&
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Representative Conyers opened by asserting that "[p]rofessional
baseball is the only industry in the United States exempt from the anti-
trust laws without being subject to regulatory supervision." 98 Represen-
tative Conyers stressed that baseball's numerous work stoppages begged
for a Congressional response in order to bring baseball within the same
antitrust purview as other professional sports.99
The commentary offered by Jim Bunning (R-Ky.) was particularly
interesting because he is a member of the Baseball Hall of Fame and a
former member of the Executive Board of the Major League Baseball
Players Association. He threw his "strong support" behind the legisla-
tion, 00 while stating that "[p]ersonally, I think this exemption should be
repealed altogether."''1 1 Representative Sherwood L. Boehlert (R-NY),
the chairman of the Minor League Baseball Caucus,' °2 after naming
some baseball luminaries, pointed out the importance of the legislation's
maintenance of the antitrust exemption for minor league baseball and its
35 million fans.'03
The Congressional commentary on the Curt Flood Act of 1998 un-
derscored the narrow scope of the legislation. Although heralded as an
important step forward in providing major league baseball players with
similar antitrust rights as basketball and football players, the nonstatu-
tory labor exemption far overshadows the value of antitrust rights in the
professional sports context.
THE NONSTATUTORY LABOR EXEMPTION
To gauge the value of the Curt Flood Act of 1998 for major league
baseball players, one must discuss the development of the nonstatutory
labor exemption alluded to in section (d)(4) of the act.0 4 The develop-
ment of this exemption during the past three decades has left most pro-
fessional team sports' athletes in a position where collective bargaining
98. 144 Cong. Rec. H9942-03, H9943 (1998).
99. See id,
100. Id.
101. 144 Cong. Rec. at H9945.
102. For a discussion of Representative Boehlert and the Minor League Baseball Caucus,
see, e.g., Robert Gavin, Boehlert's Hardball Politics May Be His Calling, But Baseball is a
Passion for Rep. Sherwood Boehlert, SYRcusE PoST-STANDARD, Aug. 11, 1997, at Al; Paul
White, Will Antitrust Fight Wreck the Minors, BASEBALL WEEKLY, Mar. 5,1997, at 2; Jonathan
D. Salant, Minor Leagues Find Backing in Congress, CLEvErAND PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 22,
1993, at 10A; Penny Bender, New Caucus Enters Fray Over Baseball Exemption, GANN=TT
NEvs SRvIcE, Aug. 20, 1993.
103. See 144 Cong. Rec. at H9945.
104. Pub. L. No. 105-297, § (d)(4).
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and the policy of federal labor laws will nearly always trump antitrust
claims.
Prior to addressing the nonstatutory labor exemption in the sports
context, it is important to consider the development of the relationship
between antitrust laws and labor laws in Supreme Court jurisprudence
throughout this century. The early relationship between antitrust laws
and labor laws tilted strongly towards the preeminance of antitrust laws.
In 1908 the Supreme Court in Loewe v. Lawlor'0 5 decided that union
collective activity violated the Sherman Act." 6 The lawsuit focused on
the actions of United Hatters of North America, a member of the Amer-
ican Federation of Labor, against the co-partners, owners of Loewe &
Company, a Danbury, Connecticut hat-making factory. Congress ulti-
mately responded by creating a statutory exemption'0 7 for labor law
which provided that labor unions were not illegal combinations in re-
straint of trade and limited federal courts in their injunctive powers in
the area of labor law.
In 1940 the Supreme Court in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader' consid-
ered the antitrust liability of a union, the American Federation of Full
Fashioned Hosiery Workers, involved in a sit-down strike against the
Apex Hosiery Company.10 9 The purpose of the strike was to force Apex
to recognize the union.110 The Court held that the strike was not a re-
straint directed at the product market of Apex's business"' and did not
produce effects which the Sherman Act proscribed." 2 The statutory ex-
emption was determined to insulate legitimate collective bargaining
activity. 13
The following year in United States v. Hutcheson,"4 the Supreme
Court considered a charge of a Sherman Act violation against a carpen-
ter's union, the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of
America, and its officials." 5 This was based upon the union's nation-
105. 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
106. See id. at 292-297.
107. The statutory exemption is based on sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 17 and 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1994) and the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1994).
108. 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
109. See id at 480-481.
110. See id. at 481-482.
111. See id. at 501.
112. See id. at 502-503.
113. See Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. at 503.
114. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
115. See id. at 228.
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wide picketing and boycotting of Anheuser-Busch." 6 The union was in-
volved in a jurisdictional dispute between itself and a machinists' union,
the International Association of Machinists, working for Busch." 7 The
court determined that the statutory exemption immunized union activity
"(s)o long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with
non-labor groups.' ' 8
In 1945 the Supreme Court in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union 13,
IBEW119 rendered its first decision expanding the statutory exemption to
include agreements between management and labor.'20 The focus of the
Court's inquiry was the activity of Local No. 3 of the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers towards electrical equipment manu-
facturers and contractors trying to enter the New York City market.' 2'
Under the agreement, contractors were required to purchase equipment
only from manufacturers employing union members, and manufacturers
could sell equipment only to contractors using union employees. 2 2 The
effects were to increase profits for participating companies, force union
wages higher, and shorten hours."z Justice Black's opinion established a
balancing of Congressional antitrust policy with the goal of preserving
the right of labor to organize and gain better working conditions. 24 Jus-
tice Black determined that the exemption would not protect this activity
because the labor group participated with management in activities that
the Court characterized as a conspiracy to monopolize.'2
The next major Supreme Court decision involving the nonstatutory
exemption was United Mine Workers v. Pennington.'26 The labor exemp-
tion claim arose from a cross-claim filed by Phillips Brothers Coal Com-
pany against the United Mine Workers alleging a Sherman Act
violation.127 The company claimed that the union had conspired with
larger coal companies to eliminate small producers.12 This was effectu-
ated by imposing a prior wage agreement on all operators. 29 The small
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. Id. at 232.
119. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
120. See id. at 798.
121. See id. at 798-799.
122. See id. at 799-800.
123. See id. at 799.
124. See Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 806.
125. See id. at 811.
126. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
127. See id. at 659.
128. See id. at 660.
129. See id.
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operators were caught between the union's demand for a higher wages
package and the ability of the larger companies to cut prices.13 0 The
action was held not to be immune from application of the antitrust law
solely because of union involvement.' A critical factor was the pres-
ence of the union-employer conspiracy to control conditions beyond
their immediate bargaining concerns. 132
On the same day, in Local Union 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v.
Jewel Tea Co.,1 33 the Court considered a collective bargaining agreement
between a butchers' union and food stores forbidding the sale of meat
before 9:00 a.m. and after 6:00 p.m. in both service and self-service mar-
kets. 34 The Court established a balancing test regarding the antitrust
and labor law policies.135 This policy established that the union's activi-
ties were exempt from antitrust liability because the marketing-hours re-
striction was the product of arm's-length bargaining and was not at the
behest of a nonlabor group. 36
Ten years later in Connell Construction Co., Inc. v. Plumbers &
Steamfitters Local 100,13 the Supreme Court was concerned with an at-
tempt by a union to force a general contractor to agree to sub-contract
mechanical work only to firms which were parties to the union's current
collective bargaining agreement. 38 The Court concluded that the agree-
ment involved was not within the exemption because it restrained the
business market to a much greater extent than necessary in the pursuit of
better wages and working conditions.3 9 The Court determined that the
agreement
which is outside the context of a collective-bargaining relationship
and not restricted to a particular jobsite ... may be the basis of a
federal antitrust suit because it has a potential for restraining
competition in the business market in ways that would not follow
naturally from elimination of competition over wages and work-
ing conditions. 40
130. See id. at 660-661.
131. See United Mine Workers, 381 U.S. at 662-663.
132. See id. at 665-666.
133. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
134. See id. at 680.
135. See id. at 688-689.
136. See id. at 689-690.
137. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
138. See id. at 618-619.
139. See id. at 625-626.
140. Id at 635.
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THE NONSTATUTORY LABOR EXEMPTION IN Tr= SPORTS CoNTExT
Three years prior to Connell, the importance of the nonstatutory la-
bor exemption in the sports area was noted by Justice Thurgood Mar-
shall in his dissent in Flood.'4' Justice Marshall noted that "[I]t is
apparent that none of the prior cases is precisely in point. They involve
union-management agreements that work to the detriment of manage-
ment's competitors. In this case, petitioner [Flood] urges that the re-
serve system works to the detriment of labor."'1 42 Justice Marshall noted
that the Court had "rejected a claim that federal labor statutes governed
the relationship between a professional athlete and the professional
sport"'143 in Radovich v. National Football League.' 4 Justice Marshall
pointed out, however, "that the issue was not squarely faced"' 45 in
Radovich nor in Flood. Justice Marshall wished to remand the case to
the district court "for consideration of whether petitioner can state a
claim under the antitrust laws despite the collective-bargaining agree-
ment, and, if so, for a determination of whether there has been an anti-
trust violation in this case."'1 46
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals squarely addressed the nonstat-
utory exemption four years later in Mackey v. National Football
League.147 The court affirmed the decision of the District Court of Min-
nesota148 holding that the "Rozelle Rule"'14 violated section one of the
Sherman Act. In reaching this decision, the Eighth Circuit established a
three-prong test for determining the application of the nonstatutory la-
bor exemption:
We find the proper accommodation to be: First, the labor policy
favoring collective bargaining may potentially be given pre-emi-
nence over the antitrust laws where the restraint on trade primar-
ily affects only the parties to the collective bargaining
relationship.... Second, federal labor policy is implicated suffi-
141. See 407 U.S. 258, 293-294 (1972).
142. Id. at 295.
143. Id.
144. 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
145. 407 U.S. at 296.
146. Id.
147. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
148. See 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975).
149. The "Rozelle Rule," named for the Commissioner of the NFL, allowed the Commis-
sioner to award "one or more players, from the Active, Reserve, or Selection List (including
future selection choices)" of a team who signed a free agent formerly under contract to an-
other NFL team if the two teams could not arrive at an agreement over the appropriate com-
pensation to the team losing its free agent. 543 F.2d at 611.
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ciently to prevail only where the agreement sought to be ex-
empted concerns a mandatory subject of collective bargaining....
Finally, the policy favoring collective bargaining is furthered to
the degree necessary to override the antitrust laws only where the
agreement sought to be exempted is the product of bona fide
arm's-length bargaining. 150
After determining that the Rozelle Rule only affected the parties to the
agreement and that the restraint involved mandatory subjects of collec-
tive bargaining,15' the court found that the National Football League had
imposed the rule upon a union "in a relatively weak bargaining posi-
tion."' 52 The court concluded, therefore, that the NFL's Rozelle Rule
was not protected by the labor exemption.'53
In Smith v. Pro Football, Inc.,'54 the Circuit Court for the District of
Columbia concluded that the NFL's draft violated the Sherman Act.'55
The action was brought by James "Yazoo" Smith, the first round draft
choice of the Washington Redskins in 1968.156 Smith's initial NFL sea-
son ended with him suffering a serious neck injury in the Redskins' final
game. 157 The District Court for the District of Columbia decided that
the nonstatutory labor exemption was inapplicable to the draft and Pro
Football did not appeal that ruling.'58 The court went on to consider the
facts under both a per se' 59 and a rule of reason' analysis before con-
cluding that the restraint was unreasonable and a violation of the Sher-
man Act. The court felt that the appropriate standard was the rule of
reason and pointed out that this decision was in line with other courts
and commentators considering player restraints in professional sports.' 6'
Nine years later, in Wood v. National Basketball Association,62 Judge
Ralph Winter of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals strongly advanced
his opinion that player/management issues should be decided by labor
150. 543 F.2d at 614.
151. See id. at 615.
152. IL at 615-616.
153. See id. at 616.
154. 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
155. See id. at 1175.
156. See id. at 1176.
157. See id.
158. See id. at 1177, n. 11.
159. See Smith, 593 F.2d at 1177-1182.
160. I& at 1183-1189.
161. See id. at 1182.
162. 890 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
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law policies and not antitrust law. 63 Leon Wood,"6 the first round draft
choice of the Philadelphia 76ers, brought an action against the National
Basketball Association asserting that provisions of the collective bar-
gaining agreement, including the salary cap, the college draft, and
prohibitions against player corporations, violated section one of the
Sherman Act.165 Wood further contended that the nonstatutory exemp-
tion did not cover these league practices. Wood was initially offered a
one-year contract for $75,000.00 because the 76ers' payroll exceeded the
salary cap. Judge Winter decided that Wood's claim that provisions of
the agreement constituted a per se violation of the Sherman Act was a
"wholesale subversion" of national labor policy which "must be rejected
out of hand."'16 6 Judge Winter also rejected Wood's arguments that the
agreements prevented him from achieving his full-market potential' 67
and that future employees should not be subject to the exemption be-
cause they were outside of the bargaining unit. 68
THE EFFECr OF THE NONSTATUTORY LABOR EXEMPTION UPON THE
NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS AssOCIATION'S
1987 STRIKE AND ITS AFTERMATH
On August 31, 1987, the Collective Bargaining Agreement executed
on December 11, 1982, between the National Football League and the
National Football League Players Association expired. 169 The 1982
Agreement came after a 57-day strike by the players.' 70 A point of sig-
nificant conflict between the players and owners was the Right of First
Refusal/Compensation system established in March 1, 1977, after the de-
mise of the Rozelle Rule. During the five years that the 1982 Agree-
ment was in effect, not a single veteran NFL player switched teams T.'
When negotiations failed to produce an agreement after the beginning of
163. Judge Winter was the coauthor with Michael S. Jacobs of an influential article in the
1971 Yale Law Journal, Michael S. Jacobs & Ralph Winter, Antitrust Principles and Collective
Bargaining by Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE LJ. 1 (1971).
164. Wood is currently a referee in the National Basketball Association. See, e.g., Ed
Sherman, Michael Jordan: He Was No Bowie (Thankfully), Cm. Tim., Jan. 24, 1999, at 4,
Janis Carr, County Takes Time to Honor Its Own Hall of Fame: Seven Who Made Their Name
in Sports Are Honored at Induction Ceremony, ORANGE CouTmY REG., May 1, 1998, at D2.
165. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
166. 890 F.2d at 959.
167. See id. at 960.
168. See iL at 960-961.
169. See Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 781.
170. See id. at 780.
171. See iL at 781.
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the 1987 season, the players went on strike on September 22, 1987.172
The NFL responded by using substitute players in regularly scheduled
games. The union concluded the strike on October 15, 1987.173
On the same day that the strike ended, a group of players led by
named plaintiff Marvin Powell 74 filed suit in the United States District
Court of Minnesota alleging that the compensation system violated the
Sherman Act. The case was assigned to Judge David S. Doty. The NFL
argued that the nonstatutory labor exemption protected the Right of
First Refusal/Compensation system under two theories, the absolute im-
munity theory 7 5 and the labor law "survival" doctrine. 1 76 Judge Doty
dismissed the absolute immunity doctrine 177 deciding that the NFL re-
lied too heavily upon Justice Arthur Goldberg's17 concurring and dis-
senting opinions in Jewel Tea 179 and Pennington.180 Judge Doty pointed
out that "[g]ranting a labor practice complete insulation from antitrust
scrutiny merely because the activity concerns a subject of mandatory
bargaining does not strike the proper accommodation between labor and
antitrust laws."'' Turning next to consideration of the NFL's survival
doctrine theory, Judge Doty concluded that the Mackey three-prong test
had been satisfied. In finding that the nonstatutory labor exemption sur-
vived the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, Judge Doty
decided that "parties to an expired agreement have an obligation to
maintain the status quo as to these provisions until a new agreement is
concluded or until the parties reach 'impasse'.' 82
Judge Doty then turned his attention to a discussion of the duration
during which the exemption remains in effect. The court rejected the
players' contention that protections dissolve once the employees make it
"unequivocally clear" that they no longer assent to terms or practices
because such an application would subject employers to "instant" anti-
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. Other named plaintiffs were Brian Holloway, Michael Kenn, Michael Davis, James
Lofton, Michael Luckhurst, Dan Marino, George Martin, Steve Jordan and the National Foot-
ball League Players Association.
175. See 678 F. Supp. at 783.
176. See id. at 783-784.
177. See id. at 783.
178. Former Justice Arthur Goldberg argued on behalf of Curt Flood before the Supreme
Court in Flood, 407 U.S. 258.
179. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
180. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
181. 678 F. Supp. at 783.
182. Id. at 784.
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trust liability and treble damages.'83 Judge Doty also pointed out that
the players' position would not foster the national labor policy favoring
good faith bargaining.'" 4
The court also rejected the position reached in Bridgeman v. National
Basketball Association,8 ' a parallel case involving the breakdown of the
collective bargaining process between the National Basketball Associa-
tion and National Basketball Players Association. Judge Doty quoted
the standard created in Bridgeman:
I find that the exemption for a particular practice survives only as
long as the employer continues to impose that restriction un-
changed, and reasonably believes that the practice or a close vari-
ant of it will be incorporated in the next collective bargaining
agreement. When the employer no longer has such a reasonable
belief, it is then unilaterally imposing the restriction on its em-
ployees, and the restraint can no longer be deemed the product of
arm's length negotiation between the union and the employer.' 86
Judge Doty rejected this test deciding that "the standard does not give
proper regard to the strong labor policy promoting the collective bar-
gaining process."' 7 Judge Doty also rejected the owners' position that
the exemption survived indefinitely concerning mandatory subjects of
collective bargaining or, alternatively, for the duration of the bargaining
relationship. The court rejected this position because the "proposed
standards would lead to the anomalous result that illegal provisions ex-
empted from antitrust scrutiny would continue in force longer than law-
ful terms and conditions."' 8 8 Judge Doty concluded that the
proper accommodation of labor and antitrust interests requires
that a labor exemption relating to a mandatory bargaining subject
survive expiration of the collective bargaining agreement until the
parties reach impasse as to that issue; thereafter, the term or con-
dition is no longer immune from scrutiny under the antitrust laws,
and the employer runs the risk that continued imposition of the
condition will subject the employer to liability.18 9
Judge Doty also defined the court's test for impasse as "whether, follow-
ing intense, good faith negotiations, the parties have exhausted the pros-
183. See id. at 786.
184. See id. at 787.
185. 675 F. Supp. 960 (D.N.J. 1987).
186. Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 787 (quoting Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at 967).
187. 678 F. Supp. at 787.
188. Id. at 788.
189. Id. at 788.
[Vol. 9:315
A HOLLOW GESTURE
pects of concluding an agreement."190 Judge Doty concluded that the
exemption would trump any challenged restraint until impasse was
reached on that issue, and he stayed certain motions until the issue of
impasse could be determined.19'
Judge Doty subsequently granted summary judgment to the players
on June 17, 1988, finding that impasse had been reached as to the free
agency issue.' 92 Turning to an analysis of jurisdiction to grant an injunc-
tion under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 93 Judge Doty declared that grant-
ing the injunction would "subvert the collective bargaining process and
... offend a central purpose of the... Act."'194
On appeal to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge John R.
Gibson reversed Judge Doty' 95 and sided with the NFL. Judge Gibson
recounted the analysis of the Eighth Circuit's prior decision in
Mackey. 196 Finding that the decision was not controlling because the re-
straint in question here was the result of collective bargaining, the court
decided, however, that the analytical structure for the nonstatutory labor
exemption fashioned in Mackey must be used. 97 The court considered
the impasse test adopted by the district court and analyzed the
Bridgeman decision.198 The court decided that the parties "have not
reached the point in negotiations where it would be appropriate to per-
mit an action under the Sherman Act."'199 Noting that the labor laws
permit numerous remedies to both management and labor after im-
passe,20 0 the court pushed the application of the nonstatutory labor ex-
emption beyond impasse.20 '
As a result of the Eighth Circuit's decision, the Executive Committee
of the NFLPA met on November 3, 1989,202 and considered withdrawing
as the collective bargaining agent for all NFL players. Three days later
the Executive Committee notified the NFL Management Council that it
would abandon its rights to bargain on behalf of the players.20 3 The de-
190. Id. (citing Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478 (1967)).
191. See iL at 789.
192. See 690 F. Supp. at 812.
193. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1994).
194. 690 F. Supp. at 817.
195. See 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989).
196. See id. at 1297.
197. See id. at 1298.
198. See id. at 1299-1300.
199. Id. at 1302.
200. See 930 F.2d at 1302.
201. Id. at 1304
202. McNeil, 764 F. Supp. 1351, 1354.
203. See id.
1999]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
cision of the NFLPA Executive Committee was supported by over sixty
percent of the players. °4 The NFLPA asserted that its status had
changed from a labor union to a voluntary professional association and
that this decertification reestablished the right to assert antitrust claims
because the nonstatutory exemption certainly could not insulate the
NFL's newly imposed Plan B.2°5 Finding that
[b]ecause no 'ongoing collective bargaining relationship' exists,
the court determines that nonstatutory labor exemption has
ended.... In the absence of continued union representation, the
Eighth Circuit's rationale for the exemption no longer applies be-
cause the parties may not invoke any remedy under the labor
laws, whether it be collective bargaining, instituting an NLRB
proceeding for failure to bargain in good faith or resorting to a
strike.206
Judge Doty offered four orders to conclude his decision in McNeil, in-
cluding striking the NFL's labor exemption defenses.20 7
In September 1992, a jury finally received an opportunity to consider
whether or not the NFL's Plan B violated antitrust laws.208 The jury
found in favor of the players, paving the way for more litigation20 9 and
the ultimate resolution of the litigation with the signing of a new collec-
tive bargaining agreement.210 However, the last chapter of this volume
between the NFL and the NFLPA over the nonstatutory labor exemp-
tion was just beginning to unfold in the District of Columbia.211
Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.
The culmination of the twenty year judicial consideration of the non-
statutory labor exemption in the sports area was the decision in Brown v.
Pro Football, Inc.21 2 At issue was the imposition by the NFL of Resolu-
tion G-2.213 In 1989 the NFL created a new Developmental Squad of up
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. Id. at 1359.
207. See 764 F. Supp. at 1360.
208. See Jackson v. National Football League, 802 F. Supp. 226, 229 (D. Minn. 1992).
209. See White v. National Football League, 822 F. Supp. 1389 (D. Minn. 1993).
210. See id. at 1395.
211. During the ongoing litigation surrounding the fractured relationship between the
NFL and the NFLPA, Judge Winter had another opportunity to comment upon the relation-
ship between labor laws and antitrust laws in Willians v. National Basketball Ass'n, 45 F.3d
684 (2d Cir. 1995). Judge Winter again determined that the nonstatutory labor exemption
triumphed over an attempt to bring antitrust laws back to the forefront.
212. 821 F. Supp. 20, rev'd, 50 F.3d 1041, affd, 116 S. Ct. 2116 (1996).
213. See 50 F.3d at 1046.
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to six rookie or first year players.214 The crux of the concern to the
NFLPA was the NFL's decision to create a fixed salary.215 On May 17,
1989, the NFL's management committee proposed a uniform salary of
$1,000.00 per week for all Developmental Squad players.21 6 Prior to the
suggestion of a new Developmental Squad salary cap, such players had
been able to negotiate their own salary and benefits.217 Although the
NFLPA disputed the fixed salary aspect of the proposal, the NFL unilat-
erally imposed the plan.218
In May 1990, 235 Developmental Squad players, led by named plain-
tiff Antony Brown, filed suit claiming that the agreement to fix salaries
at $1,000.00 per week violated the Sherman Act.21 9 The district court
ruled that the actions of the NFL were not insulated by the nonstatutory
labor exemption, and the case went to trial.220 The jury award after
treble damages exceeded $30 million.221
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit reversed the lower court decision in a split two to one vote.2' Judge
Harry T. Edwards, writing for the majority, ruled
(a)fter reviewing relevant Supreme Court precedent and the poli-
cies underlying both the NLRA and the Sherman Act, we con-
clude that the nonstatutory labor exemption shields from antitrust
challenge alleged restraints on competition imposed through the
collective bargaining process, so long as the challenged actions
are lawful under the labor laws and primarily affect only a labor
market organized around a collective bargaining relationship.
Because the fixed salary for Developmental Squad players is such
an action, we hold that the exemption shields the clubs and the
NFL from liability in this case.'
In her dissenting opinion, Judge Patricia Wald argued that the major-
ity opinion granted the NFL total immunity from antitrust liability as
long as the league and the employee players had engaged in a collective
214. See id.
215. See id
216. See id
217. See id
218. See 50 F.3d at 1046-1047.
219. See id at 1047.
220. See id
221. See id.
222. See id at 1044.
223. 50 F.3d at 1046.
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bargaining relationship regarding the Developmental Squad issues.224
Judge Wald also asserted that
[t]he majority insists its ruling does no more than maintain a level
playing field in employer-employee relations and carry out the
congressional mandate favoring collective bargaining as the pri-
mary means of resolving labor disputes. I do not think so. The
reality is that today's decision sharply tilts the playing field in em-
ployers' favor, and because of that, will erode the vitality of col-
lective bargaining itself.225
The players appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Justice
Stephen Breyer wrote the opinion affirming the circuit court's ruling.
After carefully considering prior precedent, Justice Breyer queried "[I]f
the antitrust laws apply, what are employers to do once impasse is
reached?" 2 6 Justice Breyer's consideration of a number of alternatives
led him to conclude that potential antitrust liability could create an un-
stable collective bargaining process.2 27 Justice Breyer determined that
the appropriate deference to the collective bargaining process required
the disallowance of the use of antitrust laws. 2 Justice Breyer next dis-
counted "several suggestions for drawing the exemption boundary line
short of this case, '229 before finally holding
that the implicit ("nonstatutory") antitrust exemption applies to
the employer conduct at issue here .... Our holding is not in-
tended to insulate from antitrust review every joint imposition of
terms by employers, for an agreement among employers could be
sufficiently distant in time and in circumstances from the collec-
tive-bargaining process that a rule permitting antitrust interven-
tion would not significantly interfere with that process.... We
need not decide in this case whether, or where, within these ex-
treme outer boundaries to draw that line. °30
CONCLUSION
In analyzing Justice Breyer's decision in Brown, Michael J. Cozzillio
and Mark S. Levinstein231 argued that:
224. See id. at 1058.
225. Id. at 1058-1059.
226. 116 S. Ct. 2116, 2122 (1996).
227. See id. at 2123.
228. See id.
229. Id. at 2123.
230. Id. at 2127.
231. See MICHAEL J. CozzmIo & MARK S. LEvsTEiN, SPORTS LAW: CASES AmD
MATERIALS 415 (1997).
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It is now inevitable that unionized professional athletes who seek
to challenge restraints upon player mobility (or similar restraints)
through antitrust will have no alternative but to decertify their
bargaining representative and terminate the collective bargaining
relationship. 232
This position is certainly correct. Justice Breyer's decision plainly
reduces the potential value of the antitrust weapon from a treble damage
bomb to a child's pop gun that wiii necessarily remain predominantly at
the bottom of the toy chest. Justice Breyer has solidified Judge Winter's
argument from Wood that any disagreement between a union and man-
agement must be decided at the bargaining table devoid of any antitrust
leverage. This leaves all unions in the undesirable position of commit-
ting organizational suicide in order to bring their strongest legal weapon
to the fore. Does the specter of decertification and a protracted and
expensive trial strike fear in the hearts of management? It would hardly
seem so. Although management needs the insulation from possible anti-
trust liability that the nonstatutory labor exemption supplies, the odds
that a union will resort to this strategy seem increasingly remote.
The National Basketball Association's recent player lockout pro-
vided management with the tactical advantage of placing the issues
squarely in the labor realm. Any thought of decertification had to be
considered within the context of the Brown decision. What amount of
time would satisfy Judge Breyer's position? Union decertification cre-
ates the possibility of stripping away all benefits contained in the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. How many players would be willing to risk
the loss of significant wages and benefits for the uncertainty of reenter-
ing the judicial system to ascertain if they have been without a collective
bargaining representative for the necessary time to satisfy a court con-
struing the Brown decision? In each case where a players association
has successfully orchestrated and financed antitrust litigation since the
advent of the collective bargaining era, the result has been a monetary
settlement and/or a quick return to the bargaining table to hammer out a
new agreement. Union self-preservation has mandated this result. The
only alternative would be the chaos of individual negotiation. Cozzillio
and Levinstein's additional observation and metaphor would also appear
to be accurate:
If Brown functionally forecloses player restraint issues from anti-
trust review, then the removal of the baseball exemption in this
area may be a toothless advance for the players. In essence, they
232. Id.
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have left the frying pan of the baseball exemption to the fire of
Brown and its 'decertify or forget the Sherman Act' mandate.z3
Over twenty-five years after the Supreme Court's decision in Flood,
Congress finally enacted legislation named to honor the memory of the
former Cardinals player who refused to accept a trade and, instead, at-
tempted to use the power created by Congress in 1890 when it passed
the Sherman Antitrust Act to free himself from the impact of the reserve
clause. Baseball players would have to wait for an arbitrator's decision
growing out of a collective bargaining agreement to rid themselves of the
reserve clause. Despite Congressional action in 1998, baseball players
will assuredly need to continue to resort to collective bargaining rather
than antitrust laws to establish their employment relationship with the
owners of major league baseball clubs. The language of the Curt Flood
Act of 1998 and the legislative intent argue strongly for the narrowest
use of antitrust laws in furtherance of the goals of major league baseball
players. With the widening gap between large market and small market
teams in baseball, the prospect of labor peace in Major League Baseball
has not been significantly advanced by the passage of the Curt Flood Act
of 1998.
233. Id.
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APPENDIX
CURT FLOOD ACT OF 1998
PUB. L. 105-297, 112 STAT. 2824
AN ACT TO REQUIRE THE GENERAL APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST
LAWS TO MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Curt Flood Act of 1998".
SEC. 2. PURPOSE.
It is the purpose of this legislation to state that major league baseball
players are covered under the antitrust laws (i.e., that major league base-
ball players will have the same rights under the antitrust laws as do other
professional athletes, e.g., football and basketball players), along with a
provision that makes it clear that the passage of this Act does not change
the application of the antitrust laws in any other context or with respect
to any other person or entity.
SEC. 3. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO
PROFESSIONAL MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL.
The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. See. 12 et seq.) is amended by adding at
the end the following new section:
"SEC. 27. (a) Subject to subsections (b) through (d), the conduct,
acts, practices, or agreements of persons in the business of organized
professional major league baseball directly relating to or affecting em-
ployment of major league baseball players to play baseball at the major
league level are subject to the antitrust laws to the same extent such
conduct, acts, practices, or agreements would be subject to the antitrust
laws if engaged in by persons in any other professional sports business
affecting interstate commerce.
"(b) No court shall rely on the enactment of this section as a basis for
changing the application of the antitrust laws to any conduct, acts, prac-
tices, or agreements other than those set forth in subsection (a). This
section does not create, permit or imply a cause of action by which to
challenge under the antitrust laws, or otherwise apply the antitrust laws
to, any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements that do not directly relate
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to or affect employment of major league baseball players to play base-
ball at the major league level, including but not limited to.-
"(1) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons engag-
ing in, conducting or participating in the business of organized pro-
fessional baseball relating to or affecting employment to play
baseball at the minor league level, any organized professional base-
ball amateur or first-year player draft, or any reserve clause as ap-
plied to minor league players;
"(2) the agreement between organized professional major league
baseball teams and the teams of the National Association of Profes-
sional Baseball Leagues, commonly known as the "Professional
Baseball Agreement', the relationship between organized profes-
sional major league baseball and organized professional minor league
baseball, or any other matter relating to organized professional base-
ball's minor leagues;
"(3) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons engag-
ing in, conducting or participating in the business of organized pro-
fessional baseball relating to or affecting franchise expansion,
location or relocation, franchise ownership issues, including owner-
ship transfers, the relationship between the Office of the Commis-
sioner and franchise owners, the marketing or sales of the
entertainment product of organized professional baseball and the li-
censing of intellectual property rights owned or held by organized
professional baseball teams individually or collectively;
"(4) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements protected by
Public Law 87-331 (15 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 et seq.) (commonly known as
the 'Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961');
"(5) the relationship between persons in the business of organ-
ized professional baseball and umpires or other individuals who are
employed in the business of organized professional baseball by such
persons; or
"(6) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons not in
the business of organized professional major league baseball.
"(c) Only a major league baseball player has standing to sue under
this section. For the purposes of this section, a major league baseball
player is-
"(1) a person who is a party to a major league player's contract,
or is playing baseball at the major league level; or
"(2) a person who was a party to a major league player's contract
or playing baseball at the major league level at the time of the injury
that is the subject of the complaint; or
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"(3) a person who has been a party to a major league player's
contract or who has played baseball at the major league level, and
who claims he has been injured in his efforts to secure a subsequent
major league player's contract by an alleged violation of the antitrust
laws: Provided however, That for the purposes of this paragraph, the
alleged antitrust violation shall not include any conduct, acts, prac-
tices, or agreements of persons in the business of organized profes-
sional baseball relating to or affecting employment to play baseball at
the minor league level, including any organized professional baseball
amateur or first-year player draft, or any reserve clause as applied to
minor league players; or
"(4) a person who was a party to a major league player's contract
or who was playing baseball at the major league level at the conclu-
sion of the last full championship season immediately preceding the
expiration of the last collective bargaining agreement between per-
sons in the business of organized professional major league baseball
and the exclusive collective bargaining representative of major
league baseball players.
"(d)(1) As used in this section, 'person' means any entity, including
an individual, partnership, corporation, trust or unincorporated associa-
tion or any combination or association thereof. As used in this section,
the National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues, its member
leagues and the clubs of those leagues, are not "in the business of organ-
ized professional major league baseball".
"(2) In cases involving conduct, acts, practices, or agreements that
directly relate to or affect both employment of major league baseball
players to play baseball at the major league level and also relate to or
affect any other aspect of organized professional baseball, including but
not limited to employment to play baseball at the minor league level and
the other areas set forth in subsection (b), only those components, por-
tions or aspects of such conduct, acts, practices, or agreements that di-
rectly relate to or affect employment of major league players to play
baseball at the major league level may be challenged under subsection
(a) and then only to the extent that they directly relate to or affect em-
ployment of major league baseball players to play baseball at the major
league level.
"(3) As used in subsection (a), interpretation of the term 'directly'
shall not be governed by any interpretation of section 151 et seq. of title
29, United States Code (as amended).
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"(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the applica-
tion to organized professional baseball of the nonstatutory labor exemp-
tion from the antitrust laws.
"(5) The scope of the conduct, acts, practices, or agreements covered
by subsection (b) shall not be strictly or narrowly construed."
